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A Failure or
"A Very Great Public Service"?
Herbert Hoover, Iowa Banks, and
the National Credit Corporation
CALVIN W. COQUILLETTE
IN THE FALL OF 1931, following banking crises in Germany
in July and Great Britain in September, the Urüted States bank-
ing industry faced its own crisis of confidence. Perhaps the best
indicator for measuring confidence, or the lack of it, was the
number of bank failures. Bank failures nafionw i^de were acceler-
afing—dramafically. According to convenfional wisdom, banks
failed primarily because they lacked liquidity. After all, German
banks and Bdfish hanks—and their respecfive central banks—
had not been able to maintain sufficient cash reserves to safisfy
depositors; consequently, they were forced to declare moratori-
ums or renege on their commitment to pay in gold as the gold
standard required. Believing that the problem of American banks
could be reduced to a problem of liquidity. President Herbert
Hoover proposed that the nafion's banks form their own nafion-
wide credit associafion to provide interbank liqviidity loans. In
October 1931 this corporafion came to be known as the Nafional
Credit Corporafion (NCC).
In mid-September, Hoover had good reason to believe that
such an associafion of private-sector barücs could at least check
if not reduce the bank failure rate. First, he believed that banks,
spearheaded by the New York City banks, could effecfively
spread liquidity throughout their industry. Second, he believed
that a bank associafion could do so far more efficiently than a
I am grateful to the anonymous reviewers for the Annals of Iowa, whose com-
ments helped me improve this article.
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start-up government agency or the Federal Reserve System,
which had less than one-third of all banks as members. Finally,
he believed that because the liquidity problem affected only a
few firms in a few industries (namely, farm banks, railroads,
and some life insurance companies), formafion of a new federal
agency was premature. There was, to be sure, a federal prece-
dent; the old War Finance Corporafion, begun during World
War I, had served as an engine of credit for the warfime economy.
But Hoover was convinced inifially that the proper role of the
federal government was to persuade, not to coerce. The banks,
he thought, certainly had the organizafion, resources, and capa-
bility to care for their own. Thus he established the Nafional
Creclit Corporafion to encourage "associafionalism" among the
banks. Somefime in nnid-November, however. Hoover came to
realize that federal resources would be required. The eventual
result was the Reconstrucfion Finance Corporafion (RFC).
Herbert Hoover himself dismissed the organizafion, opera-
fion, and results of the Nafional Credit Corporafion as a failure.
Hoover's epitaph was brief: "After a few weeks of enterprising
courage, the bankers' Nafional Credit Associafion became ultra-
conservafive, then fearful, then finally died."' Most historians,
assuming that the NCC's "paltry" $10 million in loans to dis-
tressed banks in its first three months of operation is the sum of
the story, have followed Hoover's lead in casfigafing the bank-
ers and the NCC.^  From the perspecfive of Iowa banks, how-
ever, the NCC can be viewed as a qualified success during in-
termittent periods from October 1931 to February 1932. Amer-
ica's banking industry sought to stave off bank failures by par-
1. Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover, vol. 3, The Great Depression,
1929-1941 (New York, 1952), 97.
2. The adjective "paltry" is from James Stuart Olson, Herbert Hoover and the
Reconstruction Pinance Corporation, 1931-1933 (Ames, 1977), 31. The same ad-
jective is used by David M. Kennedy, Preedom from Pear (New York, 1999), 83.
See also Gerald D. Nash, "Herbert Hoover and the Origins of the Reconstruc-
tion Finance Corporation," Mississippi Valley Historical Review 46 (1959), 455-68;
Albert U. Romasco, The Poverty of Abundance: Hoover, the Nation, the Depression
(New York, 1965), 87-91,181-82; Harris G. Warren, Herbert Hoover and the Great
Depression (New York, 1967), 140-42; William E. Leuchtenburg, The Perils of
Prosperity, 1914-1932 (Chicago, 1966), 257; Anthony J. Badger, The New Deal:
The Depression Years, 1933-1940 (New York, 1989), 47; and Michael E. Parrish,
Anxious Decades (New York, 1992), 250-51.
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ticipating in a massive cooperative effort and by providing li-
quidity loans to troubled banks. True, the NCC did not create
new money, finance new factories, stimulate additional credit,
or firm up bond prices. But the NCC did prevent dozens of
bank failures—that can be seen in Iowa alone—and it did inject
some renewed confidence in banks at certain intervals. Perhaps
its most useful service was establishment of an organizational
floor for the launch of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation
(RFC) in February 1932. The Iowa bank perspective from Octo-
ber through February provides a counter view to the historical
assessment of "failure."
HOOVER first broached the idea of a "Nafional Credit Asso-
ciation" to the Federal Reserve Advisory Council on September
15, 1931.' Then, following England's abandonment of the gold
standard on September 21, he met with George Harrison, presi-
dent of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York; Andrew Mellon,
Secretary of the Treasury, and his assistant, Ogden Mills; and
Albert Wiggin, chairman of the Chase National Bank of New
York. To stabilize the precarious banking situafion in the United
States, Hoover called for a "unity of acfion in the face of unset-
tlement due to European economic events"; the underwriting of
a $500 million bankers' associafion led by New York City banks
"to support weak spots in banking"; bank associafion loan ad-
vances to receivers of closed banks (about 2,000 had failed since
the stock market crash of October 1929) "so as to pay some divi-
dend upon deposits"; extension of bank eligibility in the Federal
Reserve System; recreafion of a War Finance Corporafion with
$1.5 billion of resources; and a strengthening of the Federal Farm
Loan agencies to reassure bondholders.^
3. The notation in Hoover's handwriting appears on a Federal Reserve Advi-
sory Board meeting agenda: "These men met with the President at the White
House. Here the Près, first proposed the plan of the National Credit Associa-
tion." Presidential Subject Files (hereafter PSF), Federal Reserve Board Corre-
spondence 1931, box 159, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch,
Iowa (hereafter HHPL).
4. Again in Hoover's handwriting, "Programme proposed to Harrison, Mills,
Mellon, and Wiggin Friday, September 25, 1931," PSF, Financial—Laval Visit
Memoranda, box 1013, HHPL.
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Before proposing the NCC, Hoover had gathered crifical
informafion from his advisers. At Hoover's request. Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury Ogden Mills provided an esfimate of
total hoarded currency and a month-by-month breakdown of
bank failures since January 1, 1930, with nafional banks shown
separately from state-chartered banks. In addifion. Hoover asked
Eugene Meyer, chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, for a
"solufion [to] the problem of frozen deposits in our closed
barücs" (which totaled about $2 billion since the crash). In mid-
September 1931, the Federal Reserve staff had esfimated the
amount of currency hoarded to be a "rock-bottom minimum" of
$400 million—"and may be as much as $700 million." By the end
of September 1931, Mills esfimated that the total had climbed to
$800 million. If one adds frozen deposits in failed banks to the
amount being hoarded by people who were afraid of banks,
then about $3 billion, or roughly 7 percent of total bank de-
posits, was cut off from circulafion in the economy'
Hoover then called a meefing of 19 New York bankers, held
clandesfinely at Treasury Secretary Mellon's Washington, D.C,
apartment on Sunday, October 4. Attribufing the exisfing eco-
nomic paralysis to the prolonged business depression, the suc-
cession of financial events abroad, the failures of banks in in-
creasing numbers, and the destrucfion of confidence and rising
fear around the country. Hoover called for "concerted acfion on
the part of our leading bankers and strong banks to avert a pos-
sible threat to our enfire credit structure." He noted that 1,215
banks had failed and almost $1 billion in failed bank deposits
had accumulated in the first nine months of 1931. More than
half of the failures had occurred since June, freezing an esfi-
mated $800 million in deposits. The combinafion of currency
hoarding, bank failures, and failed bank liquidation all com-
pounded geometrically. Bank failures inevitably triggered more
hoarding and necessitated asset liquidafion to pay off deposi-
tors. Sound banks, fearing bank runs, sought to increase their
5. Hoover to Meyer, 8 September 1931, PSF, Federal Reserve Correspondence
1931, box 159, HHPL; Meyer to Hoover, 15 September 1931, with attached
memorandum from Goldenweiser to Meyer, 14 September 1931 (quoted), ibid;
Mills to Hoover, 1 October 1931, PSF, Financial Matters—Banking and Bank-
ruptcy Correspondence, 1931, box 155, HHPL.
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liquidity by selling securifies. The stock, bond, and commodity
markets, with more sellers than buyers, continued to decline.
Hoover knew that "changing the eligibility provisions of the
Federal Reserve Act"—whether to require banks engaged in
interstate commerce to join the Federal Reserve, or to expand
the list of assets eligible for rediscount at the Reserve Banks—
would require fime, legislafion, and congressional hearings.
And fime. Hoover believed, was running out. A better altema-
five, he concluded, was to establish a nafional credit associafion
of all banks, to provide rediscount facilifies on sound assets not
then eligible at the Federal Reserve discount window. That, he
hoped, would "restore confidence of bank depositors." He fur-
ther suggested that a separate organizafion be set up to liquefy
the deposits in failed banks.'
Hoover theorized that if bank failures could be checked,
then hoarding would cease; if frozen bank deposits could be
"thawed," then dollars would be put back to work in local com-
munifies; if confidence could be restored among bank deposi-
tors, then perhaps bankers and investors would be more in-
clined to buy rather than sell. Clearly, the first order of business
was to stabilize the deteriorafing economy. And far better. Hoo-
ver believed, if the stabilizafion effort could be effected in the
private sector, without federal dollars and federal legislafion.
It is not clear whether all or only some of the New York
bank execufives knew about Hoover's proposition in advance;
whether all or some were so skepfical that it was doomed to
failure from the begirming; or whether the bankers absolutely
insisted on a War Finance Corporafion as a quid pro quo for
setting up the Nafional Credit Associafion.' In any case. Hoover
dictated a letter to George Harrison on October 5, while en
route to Philadelphia to watch a World Series baseball game.
Hoover confirmed that the New York bankers would "take the
lead in immediate formafion of a nafional insfitufion with a
capital of $500 million," which would rediscoimt bank assets
6. Copy of Prepared Statement Read to Nineteen New York Bankers Held at
Secretary Mellon's Apartment, Sunday, October 4,1931, box 158, PSF, National
Credit Corporation, Proposed Organization, HHPL.
7. Compare Olson, Hoover and the RFC, 24-25; and Parrish, Anxious Decades,
25-52,253.
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"not now eligible in the Federal Reserve System in order to as-
sure the stability of banks throughout the country from attack by
unreasoning depositors." The same enfity would loan against the
assets of dosed banks "to enable them to pay some early divi-
dend to depositors." In retum. Hoover agreed to seek legislafion
to recreate the War Finance Corporafion "if necessity required. "°
Although Congress was not in session. Hoover met with the
leaders of both polifical parfies on October 6 and issued a press
release to inform the nafion of the $500 million bankers' organi-
zafion. He reported that $150 million, or 2 percent of the net
fime and demand deposits of New York (Zity clearinghouse
banks, had already been pledged. George Harrison and Ogden
Mills, however, had convinced him that NCC loans on the as-
sets of failed banks were unrealisfic. "The technical difficulfies
of disposing of the assets of closed banks [through the NCC] as
well as the amounts involved," Harrison argued, "make it seem
impossible to tackle this part of the program."' The inability to
free up failed barúc deposits left an enormous void in Hoover's
attempt to revitalize confidence in banks. But given the mo-
mentum he had generated among bankers and legislators, and
the immediate need to inspire confidence and mifigate fear, he
opted to proceed. Hoover's announcement of the Nafional
Credit Corporafion was carried with banner headlines in the
nafion's newspapers the following morrüng, October 7.
FOLLOWING HOOVER'S ANNOUNCEMENT, bankers
across the country mobilized franfically to meet Hoover's chal-
lenge. Hoover knew that 297 banks nafionwide had failed from
August 28 through September 30. He probably did not know
that 44 of the failures, or 15 percent of the total, were Iowa banks.
Nor did he probably know that 25 more Iowa banks had failed
by October 7, the day he announced the NCC. In about 5 weeks,
more than 70 Iowa banks, including a few nafional banks, had
closed.'"
8. Hoover to Harrison, 5 October 1931, PSF, Federal Reserve, Correspondence,
1931, box 159, HHPL.
9. Harrison to Hoover, 7 October 1931, ibid.
10. Report of the Special Committee on Banking and Agricultural Credit Fa-
cilities, in Proceedings of the Forty-Sixth Annual Convention of the Iowa Bankers
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Coincidentally, a group of Iowa bankers and regulators
happened to be meeting in Des Moines on the morning of Oc-
tober 7. They greeted Hoover's NCC announcement as a god-
send. The officers of the Iowa Bankers Associafion had called a
meefing of their Council of Administrafion, Group Secretaries,
and three to four representatives from each of their eleven
(geographic) groups. Others in attendance included L. A. An-
drew, state bank superintendent; all members of the State
Banking Board; and J. B. McDougal, governor of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago. The minutes noted that "the meefing
would have been called several weeks before had there not
been the well-founded apprehension that it would have at-
tracted too much attention and only added, through any pub-
licity that might have gotten out, to the general serious situa-
tion that was daily seemingly getfing worse." If bank failures
were the primary indicator, Iowa's banks were probably more
in need of help than those in any other state of the nation. Ac-
cordingly, the IBA wired Hoover on the afternoon of October 7
that "the officers and other members of this Associafion and
your nafive state are delighted to say that your construcfive
program has aroused profound interest. A committee has to-
day been appointed with authority to do all within their
power to work through the Federal Reserve System along the
lines laid down in your statement.""
The Iow a^ bankers' reacfion to Hoover's announcement w a^s
mirrored in correspondence to the White House. Joseph Galcz
of Chicago could hardly contain his praise when he noted that
"the world series baseball game which you attended was filled
with thrills and excitement and with brilliant plays, however,
when you returned to Washington it is evident that you were
filled with the spirit of wirming your game from the Club of
depression; when you hit that half-billion dollar ball over the
Association (Des Moines, 1932), 343 (hereafter IBA Proceedings, 1932); "Changes
that have taken place among State Supervised Banks in IOWA during October
1931," 2 November 1931, File "Bank Changes," box 269, Iowa Bankers Asso-
ciation Archives, Special Collections, Parks Library, Iowa State University,
Ames, Iowa (hereafter IBAA).
11. Report of the Special Committee, in IBA Proceedings, 1932,343-44.
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left field wall in the park of depression, you became the hero
of the day.""
If the reacfion of other bankers, legislators, and private
cifizens was more restrained, it was sfiU mosfiy posifive. One
excepfion was that of Senator Smith Brookhart of Iowa, who
commented that "the plan is utterly inadequate to meet the
needs of the situafion and this is especially true of the farm
loan situafion. The President should get rid of Mellon and
Meyer and call Congress into extra session in order that a really
adequate and comprehensive program can be worked out.""
Brookhart's forecast of "utterly inadequate" was to prove
true, of course, but that hardly dimmed the inifial enthusiasm.
Because Iowa banking officials happened to be meeting on
October 7, the state "was all ready to undertake the business of
the NCC in Iowa before that Corporafion could develop itself
sufficiently to indicate what was to be done.""
The organizers of the NCC—the New York banks—
prompfiy prepared a "Plan of Orgarüzafion and Operafion."
Hoover and Mills received their copies on October 15. Mills
responded that the NCC's $1 billion in gold notes "will be
accepted as collateral for public deposits."' Within ten days of
the October 7 announcement, the NCC had filed its articles of
incorporafion, issued a Plan of Organizafion and Operafion,
elected a board of 12 men, one from each of the Federal Re-
serve Districts, and held its first board meeting. By October 19
the board had appointed W. Harold Brenton, president of the
Iowa-Des Moines Nafional Bank, as chairman of the Iowa Loan
Committee. Brenton had his committee selected by October 24,
and a week later "Nafional Credit Associafion No. 4 of the 7th
Federal Reserve District," encompassing banks within the state
of Iowa, had been formed as a subsidiary of the Nafional
Credit Corporation in New York.
12. Galcz to Hoover, 7 October 1931, PSF, Financial Matters—Banking and
Bankruptcy, Correspondence, 1931, box 155, HHPL.
13. New York Times, 8 October 1931.
14. Report of the Special Committee, in IBA Proceedings, 1932,350.
15. M. N. Buckner, chairman, NCC Organization Committee, to Hoover and
Mills, 15 October 1931, and Mills to Buckner, 16 October 1931, PSF, NCC, box
159, HHPL.
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On October 21-23 and again on October 26-28, the IBA and
the Iowa Loan Committee held eleven separate group meefings
throughout the state to explain the purpose and organization
of the NCC. Almost 1,400 Iowa bank execufives attended one of
the conferences. They were obviously relieved that frozen farm
loans might yet be thawed with liquid funds. The meetings were
followed by an Iowa Loan Committee mailing on November 7
that produced a posifive respor\se from over 80 percent of all
Iowa banks. All committed to join the NCC and to subscribe 2
percent of their net fime and savings deposits. Frank Wamer,
secretary of the Iowa Bankers Associafion, noted that "the plan
is a novel one. There is no precedent to follow." Wamer, whose
state led the nafion in bank failures and whose associafion's
membership had declined by 20 percent since 1930, concluded
that "there has been a 'right about face' in the public's attitude
[toward banks] since the President's announcement." As in Iowa,
the banking organizafions in New York and other states inifially
embraced Hoover's concept with enthusiasm and commitment."
IOWA BANKERS—like farmers, businesspersons, and bankers
everywhere—could not have known that, effecfive with Brit-
ain's departure from the gold standard in September 1931, the
next three months would be among the worst in American eco-
nomic history. When bank failures mulfiplied and were high-
lighted by the press, people looked to the federal government
for a solufion. Hoover resisted any federal acfion unfil there was
no other choice. Both Hoover and Iowa bankers preferred to
await the inifial results of the NCC.
Frozen farm loans in Iowa and elsewhere were only one of
the growing economic concerns in the United States in 1931. As
revenues waned in the auto and railroad industries, U.S. Steel
insfituted a 10 percent wage cut in September. As other large
firms in other industries followed suit, an esfimated 1.7 million
industrial workers were eventually affected."'
16. Report of the Special Committee, in IBA Proceedings, 1932, 350-52; Frank
Wamer, "Pushing a Banker's National Finance Plan to Completion," 17 No-
vember 1931, p. 2, NCA Printed Matter, box 265, IBAA.
17. Badger, The New Deal, 47.
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Bond depreciafion was another serious concern. In the
New York Federal Reserve District an esfimated 346 banks with
deposits of $1.2 billion and capital of $205 n\illion (exclusive of
New York City clearinghouse banks) had shown "probable bond
shrirJcage" of $137 nüUion from the date of last examinafion. By
December 1931 the shrinkage had nearly doubled to $238 mil-
lion, more than $30 million in excess of total capital. A study
noted that "if bariks continue to be closed by reason of bond
depreciafion, the situafion must become steadily worse." Rail-
road bonds, which "have been regarded as one of the best and
most conservafive investments," consfituted more than one-fifth
of all bonds outstanding. Removing them firom the "legal list"
would force addifional sales of bonds held by trust companies,
insurance companies, and trustees. In the New York District
alone, reporfing member banks had reduced their railroad bond
holdings by $400 million. The report concluded, "Banks cannot
be expected to buy railroad bonds while there is a threat of rail-
road insolvencies and the probability of continued decline in
the prices of these bonds. They cannot be expected to employ
their funds freely while there is overhanging ¿lem the prospect
of many bank failures, which carry with them the threat of cur-
rency withdrawals and panic."'^
Unlike the banks in the New York District, Iowa barücs were
operating not just with the "prospect of many bank failures";
rather, Iowa banks were failing rapidly and successively during
most of the last six months of Í931. W. G. Jackson, cashier of the
Earlham Savings Bank in Earlham, Iowa, noted the crificism
"heaped on the banks because they will not extend more credit
to farmers." But he also noted that loans to farmers had caused
the failure of most of the bartks in Iowa. Jackson also pointed
out "the bank's duty to its depositors who have enough confi-
dence in the bank to place their money there.""
In the absence of a federal guarantee on deposits, a loss of
depositor confidence ulfimately doomed any bank to failure.
Country bankers such as H. A. Linder, cashier of the Reasoner
18. "STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL: Barücing Situation in the Second District," 8 De-
cember 1931, PSF, Federal Reserve, Correspondence, 1931, box 159, HHPL.
19. W. G. Jackson to "Gentlemen," 17 July 1931, Henry A. Wallace Papers, Special
Collections, University of Iowa Libraries, Iowa City.
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Savings Bank, knew that only too well. "The country banker
does not fear the bank examiner," he wrote, "but we do fear the
atfitude of the depositor."^" Historians who claim that banks were
unwilling—as disfinct from unable—to make loans fail to rec-
ognize that a bank's ability or willingness to loan was directly
related to the stability of deposits. And deposit stability was
directly related to depositor confidence.
The confidence of Iowa depositors in Iowa banks was re-
ñected in the state's bank deposit totals, especially in comparison
to banks nafionwide. Iowa bank deposits had been declining
steadily since 1920. For the 12 months ending June 30,1931, the
drop was about $53 million, or 12 percent. During the last six
months of 1931, Iowa banks lost another $156 million, or 22 per-
cent, compared to 11 percent for all of the nafion's banks. Loans
in Iowa banks declined by one-third in the same period, com-
pared to just over 10 percent for all banks. Loans by state-
chartered Iowa banks declined by 39 percent, deposits by 36
percent. Primarily because of declining farm prices, deposit and
loan defiafion hit the predominantly rural state-chartered banks
harder than it hit the city banks, where proporfionately more fed-
erally chartered nafional banks were located. During the 1920s
and 1930s Iowa typically led the nafion in revenue from the sale
of com and hogs, and com and hog prices declined faster than
other farm prices in the last half of 1931. During that fime, the
average price paid by packers was $4.05 per hundredweight—
less than half of the price paid in marketing year 1929-30. Com
prices were even worse. The rafio of hog prices to com prices en-
couraged hog producfion. With hog prices at their lowest level in
35 years, Iowa's 10.5 million hogs (19 percent of the U.S. total)
were a glut on the state's economy just like its failed banks.^'
If deposit stability and com and hog prices concerned Iowa
bankers and farmers in the fall of 1931, so too did the problem
of farm credit in general. According to Rex Yockey, Hanülton
20. H. A. Linder to Wallace, 20 July 1931, ibid.
21. Seventeenth Annual Report of the Federal Reserve System (Washington, DC,
1932), 79,183; Report of the [Iowa] Superintendent of Banking for the Year Ending
June 30, 1931 (Des Moines, 1931), 17; ibid., 1932, 19; Charles P. Kindleberger,
The World in Depression, 1929-1939 (Berkeley, CA, 1985), 186; U. S. Department
of Agriculture, Yearbook of Agriculture, 1932 (Washington, DC, 1933), 226.
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County Farm Bureau agent in Webster City, the problems were
fourfold. First, many Iowa communifies had "no credit facilifies
or only parfial facilifies due to closed bartks." Second, the "hys-
terical condifion" or "lack of confidence" or "mental atfitude of
depositors makes it necessary to the banker to carry large
amounts of his deposits in liquid form to meet possible with-
drawals." Third, there was a "peculiar aspect" of Iowa law that
enfified the farm mortgagor (generally a life insurance company,
not a bank) to both fitle to the land and to crops produced on or
rent received from the land. As a result, mortgaged farmers
could not borrow short-term using growing crops as collateral.
Finally, there was the position that mortgage-free fanners found
themselves in if they wished to borrow for whatever reason.
Such a loan was only eligible for rediscount with the Federal
Reserve if it was secured by "grain in the bin." As Yockey put it,
"If this man did not happen to have grain for security which
would make it [the loan] liquid, he nüght be derüed the loan.""
By fall 1931, the farm mortgage crunch was apparent in Iowa
and surrounding farm states. The average per acre value of Iowa
farmland had declined fi:om $210 in 1920 to $128 in 1929 and to
$109 in 1931. In 1929 the prevailing amount that could have been
mortgaged on Iowa farmland was $81.63 per acre, or about 64
percent of the value; by late 1931, the average mortgage amount
had declined by about one-third to $55.33 per acre, or about 50
percent of the value. Moreover, the number of farm mortgage
concerns "acfively lending" had dropped by over 70 percent.
During the 1920s, many farm mortgage lenders, including banks,
had permitted their farm borrowers to pay interest only. By 1931,
however, over 90 percent of all farm mortgage lenders required
borrowers to regularly reduce loan principals. The crunch was
especially pronounced in Iowa. Of an esfimated nafionwide total
of $9.2 billion in farm mortgage debt, which required $568 mil-
lion in annual interest, Iowa farms accounted for $1.1 billion,
with interest of almost $70 million. Almost one-quarter of Iowa's
gross farn\ income went to service farm mortgage debt, com-
pared to 10 percent for the nafion as a whole. The total dollar
an\ount of mortgaged farmland in Iowa was about double that of
22. Rex Yockey to R. K. Bliss, 10 October 1931, PSF, Farm Matters, 1931, box
127, HHPL.
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California and Texas, the next two highest states, with combined
arable crop acreage about five fimes Üiat of Iowa."
In short, deposit declines and marginal farm mortgage and
operafing loans had forced many Iowa hemks to close in the
decade preceding 1931. The state had lost more than 900 of its
barücs since 1921; 208 failures, 12 percent of the U.S. total, oc-
curred in 1931 alone. In the past decade, American bank failures
had buried a total of $4.9 billion in deposits, with almost $380
million, or 8 percent, emanafing from Iowa banks. Orüy Penn-
sylvarüa, with failed hemk deposits of $424 million, and Illinois,
with $419 million, exceeded Iowa's total." And there, the fail-
ures of large banks in Philadelphia and Chicago, which oc-
cvirred mostly in 1931, inflated their state deposit totals. With a
state populafion that was only one-third that of Philadelphia or
Chicago, Iowa's bank failures had occurred sooner and were far
more numerous and frequent. The combinafion of higher per
capita deposits in failed Iowa banks and higher per capita farm
mortgage and related loans outstanding—coupled with the
com/hog glut and further declines in grain and pork prices—
meant that cash and asset values were probably declining faster
in Iowa than in any other state.
President Hoover was certainly aware of the publicity given
to barJc failures and of weaknesses in the U.S. banking system.
But in the fall of 1931 the most important need was to inject
some confidence into the economy and provide the banks with
breathing room. Iowa bankers were frustrated by the coverage
that newspapers gave to bank closings, and Hoover's an-
nouncement of the NCC was probably designed to neutralize to
some extent the public's reacfion to those reports. James Traer,
vice-president of the Farmers Nafional Barüc in Vinton, noted in
September that "the Des Moines Register is rather making a fea-
ture of bank closings, publishing the day's closings in a column
23. "Farm Credit SituaHon in Iowa," 22 October 1931, p. 10, ibid; USDA, Year-
book of Agriculture, 1933, 699, 735. See also Patrick B. Bauer, "Farm Mortgagor
Relief Legislation in Iowa during the Great Depression," Annals of Iowa 50
(1989), 23-62, esp. table 1, "Iowa Agricultural Economic Conditions, 1911-
1940," p. 24.
24. Eighteenth Annual Report of the Federal Reserve (Washington, DC, 1933), 207,
212.
Hoover, Iowa Banks, and the NCC 401
next to the obituaries." He wondered if these items might at
least be scattered throughout the paper. J. P. Hess of the Carroll
County State Bank believed that "such news spreads rapidly
from mouth to mouth and increases the unrest." H. M. Wilson,
cashier of the State Barik of Lacona, told Frank Wamer that he
had "been checking up quite carefully among customers and
they all say pracfically the one thing, 'we read the list of bartks
closed everyday and you can't blame us for taking our money
outofthebanks.'"''
Harry AUfree of Cedar Rapids offered Hoover a pracfical, if
polifically impossible, suggesfion. Realizing that "when a de-
positor wants his money, he wants cash, not conversafion, nor
farmers' notes, nor any kind of security," AUfree suggested that
"the average person has lost confidence in everything except his
Goverrunent." He suggested that Hoover have Congress "pass
a Resolufion guaranteeing the deposits of Nafional Banks." He
pointed out that "you have charge of them now through your
Comptroller of the Currency" (the regulator of nafional barücs,
distinct from state bank regiilators), and that other banks should
not be precluded from joining the nafional bar\k system.^ * AU-
free essenfially proposed that nafional bank deposits be feder-
ally guaranteed and that state banks, if they could not meet
mirümum federal requirements, be eliminated from the system.
Had Hoover been able to bypass or convince 48 state barJ< su-
perintendents and 48 state banking boards, not to menfion the
15,000-plus state-chartered banks, that the power of bank regu-
lafion and supervision should pass from state to federal hands,
the later collapse of the industry might have been avoided.
Once again, fime and confidence were Hoover's biggest consid-
erafions, and during the month of October 1931, he did not be-
lieve that federal intervenfion was required; nor did he doubt
that the NCC was capable of solving the bank liquidity crisis.
25. Traer to Wamer, 30 September 1931, file "Press," box 268, IBAA; Hess to
Wamer, 5 October 1931, ibid.; Wilson to Wamer, 12 October 1932, ibid.
26. Allfree to Hoover, 22 October 1931, PSF, Financial Matters—Banking and
Bankruptcy Correspondence, 1931, box 155, HHPL.
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IN A PRESS CONFERENCE on October 30, Hoover an-
nounced that a "very great change" had become evident in the
financial situafion of tihe country. Currency hoarding had been
checked, gold shipments abroad had slowed, bank failures had
dropped from an average of 25 a day to seven in the past week,
and the price of wheat had advanced 10 cents a bushel. The
New York Times opined that Hoover had advanced the NCC "as
the main shaft of the machinery by which he hoped to pump
life again into the business structures of the country, and it was
obvious from his demeanor yesterday that he is finding much
safisfacfion in its operafions up to this fime." The daily trade
journal, the American Banker, had announced, "Nafional Credit
Corporafion Now Ready to Funcfion," with the sub-headline
"No Loans Made Yet; Perfecfion of Subsidiary State Associa-
fions Awaited."
The fact that no loans had been made yet concerned Walter
Stew^art, a former New^ York investment banker now serving as
an administrafion adviser on banking. He suggested that there
might be little substance to future NCC loan operafions and
was convinced that "in the existing mood of the [New York
City] bankers, they cannot be depended upon, if left to them-
selves, to put the Credit Corporafion into full and prompt op-
erafion." He urged George Harrison and Ogden Mills to "take
vigorous acfion aimed at changing the state of mind of leading
barikers in New York." He also advised that someone from the
Treasury and Federal Reserve should oversee the "actual prog-
ress" of the NCC's operafion.^'
Stewart was especially concerned, perhaps at Hoover's be-
hest, with the dilemma of closed banks and how to free up de-
posits in failed banks. There was no easy way to aggregate the
total amount of assets and liabilifies of all closed nafional banks
to produce a "combined detailed balance sheet." Every closed
nafional bank had its own bankruptcy receiver, usually a polifi-
cal appointee w h^o proceeded at his own pace with few federal
guidelines. Stewart discovered that the U.S. Treasury and the
Comptroller of the Currency had no policy for final liquidafion
27. New York Times, 31 October 1931; American Banker, 29 October 1931; Stewart
to Mills, Memorandum for Mr. Mills, 24 October 1931, PSF, NCC Correspon-
dence, box 158, HHPL.
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or eventual reopening of closed nafional banks. He recom-
mended that the Treasury proceed "through the Federal Re-
serve BarJcs" to either the NCC or the larger New York City
banks "with a view to obtaining credit upon selected assets of
closed banks and making cash distribufions to depositors."^
Nothing came of Stewart's proposals. The "polifics" of barü<:
regulafion—^which agency had what role in the case of failed
banks, the gathering of aggregate data, the appointment of re-
ceivers, and the ulfimate disposifion of each failed bank—was
left unresolved.
Iowa bankers, while no doubt concemed about failed bartks
and their depositors, were probably more concemed about sal-
vaging the state's remairüng banks. Bank survival depended on
having sufficient liquid funds on hand. Because bankers desired
to build liquidity, the NCC Iowa Associafion envisioned that the
dollar amount of loans requested might exceed the amount of
"subscripfion funds" required that were payable to New York
headquarters and based on 2 percent of net deposits. Accord-
ingly, the Iowa Loan Committee sent two of its members to
New York to secure "concrete assurance that funds would be
available." By early November, the Loan Committee had sent
out several hundred letters to prospecfive borrowing banks
urging that they "prepare their collateral and applicafions in
complete form" to submit to the committee. Frarü< Wamer re-
minded bankers that the NCC "is a giganfic undertaking, an
enterprise that is to operate in 48 states and the District of Co-
lumbia and with approximately 22,000 American barücs." Being
first in line and best organized might streamline loans to Iowa
banks in need."
Delays were inevitable. Whether they were attributable to
the New York bankers ignoring the exhortafions of Hoover and
Mills to "get moving," as one historian claims, or whether the
delays occurred at the local level, it seems that the local associa-
28. Ibid.
29. Report of the Special Committee, Bulletin No. 2 of the Iowa Credit Com-
mittee, in Proceedings, 1932, 350-51; Frank Wamer, "To: Sub-Loan Committee
for Iowa," 7 December 1931, Iowa NCA Committee Correspondence, box 266,
IBAA; Wamer, "Pushing a Banker's National Finance Plan to Completion," 3.
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fions and the local loan committees had their hands full." Frank
Warner asked Charlie Fisher, secretary/treasurer of the NCC
' Michigan Loan Committee in Detroit, about his committee's
status, policy, and operafions. Fisher admitted that while his
comnüttee had met, it had not approved any loans. Its problems
included: (1) obtaining a copy of the latest examinafion report
from the State Banking Department or the Comptroller of the
Currency; (2) determining whether or not the prospecfive bor-
rower was in basically sound condifion; (3) determining whether
the bank was operafing for the commuruty at large or for "a few
wealthy individuals for their own convenience"; and (4) deter-
mirung whether there was "an economic necessity for the bank
in its parficular locality" In addifion, collateral had to be evalu-
ated. "We are preparing to receive city and farm mortgages, col-
lateral real estate mortgages, chattel mortgages, stocks, bonds,
secured and unsecured notes of individuals, firms, or corpora-
fions substanfiated by a first-class financial statement."'' In con-
trast, the Iowa Loan Committee, because of anficipated requests
from farm banks, would have been more concerned with bank
loan policies pertaining to grain and livestock. Were farm bor-
rowers required to administer serums to prevent hog cholera?
Were crop producfion expenses in line with yields per acre?
Could other sources of farm revenue, such as eggs and cream,
be used to service operafing loans?
Dozens of local NCC Associafion Loan Committees around
the covmtry (New York state alone had eight) had to feel their
way along, relying on the tools and legal forms that bankers
knew best, and somefimes traveling hundreds of miles to a
central meeting point. Contrary to some historical interpreta-
fions, the bottleneck on booking NCC loans was more at the
local associafion level rather than in New York, at least through
December.'^
30. Olson, Hoover and the RPC, 28.
31. Warner to Charles T. Fisher Jr., 9 November 1931, Iowa NCA Correspon-
dence, box 265, IBAA; Fisher to Warner, 12 November 1931, ibid.
32. Congressional testimony in mid-December 1931 confirmed that the NCC
had advanced only about $10 million in loans. Michael Parrish comments in
Anxious Decades, 251, that "sober, cautious, judicious bankers all, the managers
at the NCC . . . feared for the liquidity of the National Credit Corporation!"
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By the first week of December, bankers arovind the country,
Iowa bankers included, had begun to lose their enthusiasm for
the NCC. Hoover later noted that "by the end of November
1931, our small burst of recuperafion had petered out, and all
the ground we had gained—and more—^was quickly lost.""
Here was the low point of the NCC, leading to Hoover's deci-
sion to ask Congress to revive the War Finance Corporafion.
Louis Kurtz, chairman of Iowa's largest bank, the Iowa-Des
Moines Nafional, wrote to Hoover to urge that the War Finance
Corporafion take the place of the Nafional Credit Corporafion.
While he thought that the NCC "is doing a fine piece of work,
they cannot do so sufficient to properly care for the situation
exisfing in the agricultural districts of the middlewest."'''
Kurtz's nephew, W. Harold Brenton, was both president of
the Iowa-Des Moines Nafional Bank and chairman of the NCC
Iowa Associafion's Loan Committee. Both men were aware that
the Iowa Loan Committee could not prudently accept Iowa
farm and chattel mortgages as collateral for NCC borrowings
with so much farmland in bankruptcy, so many banks in liqui-
dafion, and com and hog prices sfill declining. Credit had all
but shut down in the state, whether from banks, building and
loan associafions, insurance companies. Federal Land Banks, or
farm implement dealers. As Iowa Governor Dan Turner noted
in a telegram to Hoover on December 7,
We would respectfully call your attention to the very serious situ-
ation in Iowa and adjoining states. For the first time in a generation,
it seems to be impossible for our fanners to obtain even the most
conservative loan on their land. This is adding a heavy burden to
an already serious situation. Something should be done as soon as
possible to ease the farm loan market not only to aid the fanner
but also the smaller banks in agricultural communities. It is now
apparent that the War Finance Corporation should be reinstated at
once or similar method provided to meet the emergency.'^
33. Hoover, Memoirs, 3:97.
34. Kurtz to Hoover, 3 December 1931, PSF, War Finance Corporation, box 92,
HHPL.
35. Turner to Hoover, 7 December 1931, ibid.
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ON DECEMBER 7,1931, President Hoover proposed to Con-
gress that the War Finance Corporafion be reconsfituted and
renamed the "Reconstrucfion Finance Corporafion." The corpo-
rafion was intended to replace or supplement what the Nafional
Credit Corporafion had failed to do, or could not do, or had not
done, depending on one's interpretafion. Hoover proposed that
Eugene Meyer chair the RFC as he had done for the WFC, and
that the RFC legislafion be passed as soon as possible.
The House and Senate Banking Committees held hearings
before Christmas and chaUenged the results of the NCC to date.
Senator Bulkley of Ohio told Meyer that the NCC was not even
making loans. Meyer repUed that loans were being made, but he
did not know how many or the amount. Bulkley believed that
the NCC had failed. He had been told that "fiie bar\k pool found
the situafion such that loans could not be made with safety and
that the banks wanted [the RFC] to take over loans which they
considered doubtful risks." Iowa Senator Smith Brookhart, never
one to hold back if there was a chance to attack "Wall Street,"
reviewed the history of the WFC and asked Meyer, "Isn't the
present situafion brought about by the big financial crowd
making fooUsh loans after the war? You keep saying that the
proposed bill will help the small banks; what about the big New
York banks?" Meyer responded blandly, "It wiU help all the
banks and the country generally." That hardly safisfied Senator
Bulkley. He thought that the NCC "ought to funcfion before we
put this new corporafion [the RFC] into effect." Moreover, he
feared that frozen banks assets were going to be unloaded onto
\he RFC.
But that was precisely the point, responded Melvin Traylor,
president of Chicago's First Nafional Bank, in his tesfimony.
Traylor was a Democrat and a member of the Federal Reserve
Advisory Council to whom Hoover had first proposed the con-
cept of a "Nafional Credit Associafion" the previous September.
Traylor, like Hoover irüfially, saw the NCC as a temporary, vol-
untary, and emergency enfity orüy. "To pursue this policy to the
end," he argued, "would mean tying up $500 million in slow
assets," which would aggravate tihe problem of the banks and
be of no aid to the economy. The problem of financing marginal
assets that ranged from deteriorating railroad bonds to delin-
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quent farm mortgages, he confinued, should be the funcfion of
a government orgarüzafion, not the banking industry. While
Eugene Meyer thought the biggest problem was that "strong
banks are afraid of the weak ones," Melvin Traylor believed that
it was "a lack of public confidence in today's banking system."''
Both were right.
THE NCC finally made its first loar\s just after Hoover's call in
December for legislafion to erect the RFC. It made more loans
through February 1932, when Congress decisively approved the
RFC. Barxkers and NCC officials realized that the RFC legisla-
fion would easily pass despite some scattered opposifion and
that NCC advances made on marginal hank assets could prob-
ably be "taken out" or replaced by RFC funds. Senator Carter
Glass, ranking minority member of the Senate Banking Com-
mittee, acknowledged that some NCC assets would have to be
made eligible for rediscount by the Federal Reserve Banks. The
result was that the NCC served as a bridge for banks tottering
between failure and dire need of liquidity assistance.^'
Although most state associafions or loan committees were
inifially too poorly organized to process loans effecfively, the
Iowa Loan Committee, which was organized earlier and more
efficiently than most of the others, proved its worth. By year-
end 1931, a total of orüy about $10 million had been loaned na-
fionwide. One-third of that total went to three Iowa barücs.
Three million dollars had been advanced to the closed Ameri-
can Savings Bank in Davenport, soon to be reopened as the
newly capitalized Davenport Baiü< and Trust Co., and another
$650,000 had been advanced to two banks in Des Moines. In
addifion, NCC loans in late December to bariks in North Caro-
lina, Mississippi, Georgia, and Louisiana helped to stem a re-
gional crisis in the South.''
After struggling to get organized during its first three months
of operafion, the NCC finally got rolling in the next three weeks.
36. New York Times, 19 and 22 December 1931; U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings on
S. 1: Creation of a Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 71a. Cong., 1st sess., 176,263.
37. Olson, Hoover and the RFC, 29-30; Proceedings, 1932, 353.
38. Time, 28 December 1931; see also Olson, Hoover and the RFC, 30.
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By January 22,1932, the day Hoover signed the RFC legislafion,
the NCC, through its local associafions, had made total loans of
$145 million to 644 banks in 10 of the 12 Federal Reserve districts.
Some $449 million in debentures had been subscribed and $429
million in gold notes were reported signed. In the Richmond
and Atlanta districts, more than $30 million had been loaned,
excluding almost $17 million in commitments to be drawn on in
the next two weeks. In the Boston district, $14.8 million had
been advanced. An addifional $10 million had been committed
to banks in the state of Maine alone. New York district banks
had borrowed only $8.3 million, but $15.3 million was committed
to northern New Jersey banks. And although the St. Louis dis-
trict had borrowed only $6.7 million, commitments pending to-
taled $11.5 million, $5 million to troubled Arkansas banks alone.
In all, 3,940 banks, or almost one in every five banks in the
United States, joined the Nafional Credit Corporafion within 14
weeks of Hoover's first public announcement."
In the Chicago Federal Reserve district, which included Iowa,
141 banks borrowed a total of $12.2 million by January 22, not
including $6.2 milHon in commitments.'^ In the Iowa Associafion,
a total of 220 Iowa banks "manifested some direct or indirect
interest" in joining the NCC. Gross subscripfions actually re-
ceived totaled $1.1 million from 51 Iowa banks, while another
$1.2 million from 97 other banks were "in process of being got-
ten in proper form" by the fime the RFC came into existence. In
addifion, 40 Iowa barüks borrowed a total of $2 million from the
NCC, exclusive of loans made earlier to the Davenport and Des
Moines banks."' The NCC also loaned $4.7 million nafionwide
to 28 banks that were subsequently closed by January 22. The
only failed-bank loan in Iowa was for $160,000 to the Farmers
Loan and Trust Co. of Iowa City Its failure in 1932 left the city
with the distincfion of being the largest in Iowa without a bar\k
unfil the newly chartered Iowa State Bank and Trust Co. was
39. "National Credit Corporation—^Subscriptions to Gold Notes, Loans Made,
Etc., as of January 22, 1932," PSF, Financial Matters, NCC Board of Directors,
box 158, HHPL.
40. Ibid.
41. Report of the Special Committee, part 3, "National Credit Corporation," in
Proceedings, 1932,353.
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formed later that year." SfiU, 770 other banks around the coun-
try had failed since the corporafion was organized. Undoubt-
edly, the Iowa and nafionwide total would have been even
higher without the NCC.
Certainly the relafively successful NCC experience in Iowa
was tainted with frustrafion. Harold Brenton summarized it
best when he praised Frank Warner, the IBA's indefafigable sec-
retary, who also served as secretary/treasurer of the Iowa Loan
Committee. The work of the NCC, Brenton wrote, "was cer-
tainly a tedious, firesome, aggravafing job. You knew that it
would not succeed thoroughly but you sfiU went ahead and did
the best you could with the restricfions placed upon you." War-
ner had sent out 33 buUefins to IBA members and to the loan
committee since early October, the latest concerned with, among
other bureaucrafic details, authority to change "Arficles of
Agreement" of banks having subscribed and in the process of
subscribing; obtaining "Cerfificate of Elecfion of Officers" and
specimen signatures; and obtairüng "Cerfified Copy of Bank
Charter." The paperwork was overwhelming. Before considering
a loan, the NCC Chicago office required three executed copies
of a loan applicafion; three copies of "Opinion of Counsel";
three copies of "Resolufion of Board"; two copies of "Note for
Borrowing Bank"; three copies of "Security Offered by Bank";
two copies of cerfified financial statements; two cerfified copies
of the bank charter; and two cerfified copies of board resolu-
fions or bylaws relafing to loans to the bank. With each amend-
ment or change in form, Warner's office had to stop and correct
all the copies of the different forms for each bank, which "runs
into correcfing thousands of these forms at a fime." During the
fall and winter of 1931-32, Warner had two teams of six secre-
taries each, one team working from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., the
other from 5:00 p.m. to 3:00 a.m. every day except Sunday.'*'
42. Des Moines Tribune, 20 January 1932.
43. Brenton to Warner, 15 February 1932, NCC Correspondence, box 266, IBAA;
Warner to "Sub-Loan Committee" for Iowa, re.. Additional amendments on
subscription forms requested by the National Credit Association No. 1 in Chi-
cago (original underline), 7 December 1931, NCC Forms Amendments, box
266, IBAA; "Forms required by the National Credit Association Number One
of the Seventh Federal Reserve District to be executed by borrowing banks,"
undated but received on 29 November 1931 by National Credit Association
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Wamer was no doubt discouraged by the NCC's efforts and
results, but the NCC did help to salvage a few IBA member
banks. While $145 million in total NCC loans to banks hardly
represented an overwhelming success, the distribufion of loans
to marginal barücs in troubled economic spots was crucial to
relieving liquidity pressures. Confinued deflafion, loan liquida-
fion, and deposit outflows resulted in contracted bank balance
sheets. The results in Iowa indicated that barJdng and agricul-
tural credit would require unprecedented federal intervenfion if
either or both were to be salvaged.
THE REVIVAL of the War Finance Corporafion (later renamed
the Reconstrucfion Finance Corporafion) was both the federal
government's strategic attempt to deal with an economy that
had been in almost confinual decline since mid-year 1929, and
Herbert Hoover's tacfical response to the "failure" of the Na-
fional Credit Corporafion. Hoover and subsequent historians
have generally ignored three crucial intervals between October
7, 1931, when the NCC was first announced, and February 17,
1932, when the RFC began making its first loans. The first pe-
riod was October 7-30, when rampant hsnk failures were
halted, the financial markets revived somewhat, and business
regained some lost confidence. The second period was the last
half of December, when crifical NCC loans stabilized some key
banks in Iowa and throughout the South. The third period was
January and early February 1932, by which fime the local loan
committees had streamlined their procedures and NCC loans
were flowing freely. The same loan committees and streamlined
procedures remained intact for the RFC to ufilize, enabling it to
loan approximately $22 million to 325 Iowa bar\ks by Jime 1.
Without the NCC's committees and procedures, the RFC could
not possibly have analyzed, processed, and booked that many
loans that quickly.""
No. 4 of the Seventh Federal Reserve District (the Iowa Association), ibid.;
Report of the Secretary, 1931-1932," in Proceedings, 1932,338.
44. Of the approximately $22 million in RFC loans to Iowa banks through May
1932, $14.3 million was approved by the Iowa Loan Conrunittee, $4 million was
approved in Chicago, and only $3.3 million was sent directly to Washington
and approved. Although loan funds were ultimately advanced by the RFC's
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The quesfion remains whether Hoover saw the NCC as a
temporary, stopgap measure—the RFC being its inevitable se-
quel because ihe NCC had "failed"—or whether he saw the
NCC in 1931 as \he catalyst to "win the war" against the Great
Depression. It seems that Hoover, at least inifially, saw salvafion
to the bank liquidity crisis in the NCC. By November, though,
with mounting railroad problems, a declining bond market, and
volafile price swings on commodity markets, it would have
been vinrealisfic to believe that a few hundred million dollars in
interbarik liquidity loans could have salvaged the deteriorafing
economy. Both Hoover and the bankers were frustrated at fimes
by the NCC and disappointed in the results, at least through
mid-December. Yet the contemporary evidence confirms that
Hoover—contrary to the lamentafions recorded in his memoirs
twenty years later—thought the NCC served a useful purpose.
In a letter to Morfimer Buckner, president of the NCC and
chairman of the New York Trust Co., on December 14, 1932,
about a year after he called for RFC legislafion before a joint
session of Congress, Hoover requested "data" on the NCC "as
would form the basis of a future historical account of what was
really a very great public service."*^ With the complefion of the
NCC's work. Hoover expressed his grafitude for a job well done.
While frozen deposits in failed banks during December 1931
and January 1932 alone totaled over $400 million, fiie NCC
booked loans to almost 650 bariks amounfing to $145 million.
Moreover, the corporafion actually raised $449 million in
pledged subscripfions through three "installment draws" dur-
ing January 1932. Finally, the local NCC Loan Associafion com-
mittees provided the infrastructure for the RFC and were of in-
esfimable aid in launching the new program.
Washington headquarters, most of the applications and processing, especially
from smaller banks, was handled at the local level or at one of the 33 regional
offices. At its peak the RFC processed hundreds of loans each week, but only a
relative handful found their way to the RFC board of directors in Washington
for actual deliberation. See "Loans to June 1, 1932 of Reconstruction Finance
Corporation," in Proceediitgs, 1932,354.
45. Hoover to Buckner, 14 December 1932, PSF, Financial Matters—NCC Cor-
respondence, 1932, box 158, HHPL (emphasis added).
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In 1952 Hoover wrote an obituary for the NCC—"ultra-
conservafive, then fearful, then finally died"—and lamented the
delay by Congress in passing his RFC legislafion. Like the histo-
rians who have followed in his wake, he ignored the fact that
some banks and bankers were doing some crifical liquidity fi-
nancing through the NCC during this difficult period. It is true
that the amounts were small and the results were mostly inef-
fectual, especially in view of the collapse of the banking system
a year later. The NCC was the coUecfivist effort of an industry
that, with Hoover's prodding, attempted to deal with its own
hemorrhaging and salvage its failing brethren.
Historian William Leuchtenburg, wrifing in 1966, noted that
"by the autumn of 1931, bankers had carried out the policy of
deflafion so relentlessly that they were caught in their own web.
Once deflafion threatened the financial structure, bankers were
curiously unwilling to experience the spiritual benefits of chas-
tening." Leuchtenburg blamed the banks for causing deflafion,
forgetfing that plenty of "chastening" had already affected the
numbers of farm community banks and dollars of frozen de-
posits in the previous decade. He concluded that "the barJ<ers
demanded government protecfion from the consequences of
deflafion to themselves."'"
Instead, the NCC was a vintage Hoover strategem that pro-
duced some qualified success in an economy going from bad to
worse. It demonstrated that banks and the banking system
could be saved: state-chartered banks and state bankers asso-
ciafions were the keys to the NCC organizafion and operafion,
probably more sd in Iowa than in any other state. If the per-
specfive from Iowa is any indicafion, then the Nafional Credit
Corporafion was not simply a product of a demand from bank-
ers for government protecfion. If it was not an unqualified suc-
cess, neither was it a total "failure."
46. Leuchtenburg, Perils of Prosperity, 257.
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